May 3, 2024

Gold Will Benefit From The Coming Currency Turmoil

By:  Axel Merk, Merk Investments

Sidetracked by the discussion over the “fiscal cliff” and possibly a New Year’s hangover, it’s time to face 2013 in earnest. Is the yen doomed? Will the euro shine? What about Asian and emerging market currencies? Will gold continue its ascent? And the greenback, will it be in the red?

Before we look too far forward, let’s get some context:

  • “Central banks hope for the best, but plan for the worst” was our theme a year ago. With everyone afraid of the fallout from the Eurozone, printing presses in major markets were working overtime. We argued this would benefit currencies of smaller countries – be that the so-called commodity currencies or select Asian currencies – that feel less of a need to “take out insurance.”
  • While we were positive on the euro when it approached 1.18 versus the U.S. dollar in 2010, arguing the challenges are serious, but ought to be primarily expressed in the spreads of the Eurozone bond market. Then in the fall of 2011, we grew increasingly cautious because of the lack of process: just as it is difficult to value a company if one doesn’t know what management is up to, it’s difficult to value a currency if policy makers have no plan. In the spring of 2012, when we were most negative about the euro, we lamented the lack of process in a Financial Times column. European Central Bank (ECB) chief Mario Draghi appeared to agree with our concerns, imploring policy makers to define processes, set deadlines, hold people accountable. After his “do whatever it takes” speech in July 2012, he took it upon himself to impose a process on European policy makers in early August 1. We published a piece “Draghi’s genius” where we called for a bottom in the euro. We were inundated with negative feedback in the immediate aftermath of our analysis from professional and retail investors alike, confirming that were not following the herd, nor buying something that’s too expensive.
  • While we liked commodity currencies in the first half of the year because of printing presses in larger economies working overtime, we grew a little cautious as the year moved on, partly because of valuations. Each commodity currency has its own set of dynamics, as well as their own Achilles heel: in the case of the Australian dollar, we had some concerns about its two tier domestic economy (not all of Australia was benefiting from the commodity boom), but also about the perceived slowdown in China.
  • We studied the Chinese leadership transition with great interest; while 2012 may have been a year in transition, more on the dynamics as we see them play out below.
  • Back in the U.S., we squandered another year to get the house in order. The fiscal cliff was a distraction; we need entitlement reform to make deficits sustainable. Europeans have no patent on kicking the can down the road. But unlike Europe, the U.S. has a current account deficit, making it more vulnerable should investors demand more compensation to finance U.S. deficits (that is, higher interest rates).
  • Japan: the more dysfunctional the Japanese government has been, the less it could spend, the less pressure it could exert on the Bank of Japan. Add to that a current account surplus, and all this “bad news” was good news for the yen. Countries with a current account surplus don’t need inflows from abroad to finance government deficits; as a result, the absence of economic growth that keeps foreign investors away is of no detriment to the currency. Conversely, countries with current account deficits tend to pursue policies fostering economic growth to attract capital from abroad. However, in late 2012, we published a piece “Is the Yen Doomed?” What happened? Japan was about to have a strong government. More in the outlook below.

We believe the currency markets are well suited for decision-making based on macro-analysis. Just as throughout 2012 the themes were evolving, please keep in mind that our 2013 outlook may be outdated the moment it is published, as we update our views based on new information or a new analysis of old information. Still, those who have followed us over the years are well aware that we like to shift our views within a framework. Please consider our 2013 outlook in this context:

  • We believe the yen is indeed doomed. We remove the question mark. Prime Minister Abe’s new government sets the stage, but key to watch are:
    • Abe’s government will appoint the three top positions at the Bank of Japan, as the governor and both deputy governors retire. Recent appointees have already been more dovish. Japanese culture is said to prefer talk over action, but the time for dovish talk may finally be over (despite their dovish reputation, the Bank of Japan barely expanded its balance sheet since 2008; in many ways, of the major central banks, only the Reserve Bank of Australia has been more hawkish).
    • Japan’s current account is sliding towards a deficit. That means, deficits will start to matter, eventually pushing up the cost of borrowing, making a 200%+ debt-to-GDP ratio unsustainable.
    • Abe’s government is as determined as it is blind. Abe believes a major spending program is just what Japan needs. As far as the yen is concerned, Abe may be getting far more than he is bargaining for.
    • But isn’t everyone negative on the yen already? Historically, it’s been most painful to short the yen; as such, many have not walked their talk. We expect some fierce rallies in the yen throughout the year. Having said that, the yen looks a lot like Nasdaq in 2000 to us. Not as far as technicals are concerned, but as far as the potential to fall without much reprieve.
  • The euro may be the rock star of 2013. Boring is beautiful. Sure, there are plenty of problems, but the euro is morphing into yet another currency, but is still priced as if it had a contagious disease. While the Fed, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan are all likely to engage in further balance sheet expansion (we refer to it as “printing money” as assets are purchased by central banks, paid for by entries on computer keyboards, creating money out of thin air), there’s a chance the ECB balance sheet may actually shrink. That’s because some banks have indicated they will pay back early part of the €1 trillion in 3-year loans taken from the ECB. Some suggest the ECB might print a boatload of money should the “Outright Monetary Transaction” (OMT) program be activated to buy the debt of peripheral Eurozone countries. Keep in mind that the OMT program would be sterilized, likely by offering interest on deposits at the ECB. As such, the OMT would lower spreads in the Eurozone and, through that, act as a massive stimulus. In our assessment, however, such a stimulus is far less inflationary than central bank action in other regions. It’s no longer a taboo to be positive on the euro, but most we talk to are at best “closet bulls.”
  • The British pound sterling. The Brits are getting a new governor at the Bank of England (BoE) in the summer, the current head of the Bank of Canada (BoC), Carney. One of the first speeches Carney gave after his appointment was made public was about nominal GDP targeting. Carney will have a chance to replace many of the current BoE board members. That’s the good news, as the old men’s club is in need of a makeover. The not-so-good news is for the sterling. British 10 year borrowing costs have just crossed above those of France. We’ll monitor this closely.
  • As the head of the BoC, Carney was particularly apt at talking down the Loonie, the Canadian dollar, whenever it appeared to strengthen. If Macklem, his current deputy, is appointed, we may get a real hawk at the helm of the BoC. We are positive on the Loonie heading into 2013, but will monitor developments closely, as there are economic cross-currents that, for now, Canada appears to be handling very well.
  • Staying with commodity currencies, we are cautiously optimistic on the Australian dollar (China better than expected; monetary policy more hawkish than priced in) and New Zealand dollar (more hawkish monetary policy on better than expected growth). We continue to stay away from the Brazilean real and leave it for masochistic speculators looking for excitement.
  • We are positive on Norway’s currency (joining the above mentioned rock star, with greater volatility), yet cautious on Sweden’s (priced to perfection is not ideal when things are not perfect, even in Sweden).
  • China: the new leadership has indicated that liquidity for the Chinese yuan may be their top currency priority. That’s great news, as we believe it implies policies that attract investment, not just from the outside, but also with regard to a development of a more vibrant domestic fixed income market. We are more positive on China than many; more on that, in an upcoming newsletter (click to sign up to receive Merk Insights)
  • Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan: all positive, benefiting from both internal forces, but also beneficiaries of actions in other large economies. If we have to pick a favorite today, it would be Korea, but keep in mind that the Korean won is the most volatile of these currencies.
  • Singapore: we continue to like the Singapore dollar. A year ago, we started using it as a substitute for the euro (rather than using the U.S. dollar as the safe haven currency). The currency may well lag the euro’s rise, but the lower risk profile of the currency makes it a potentially valuable component in a diversified basket of currencies.
  • Gold. We expect the volatility in gold to be elevated in 2013, but consider it good news, as it keeps the momentum players at bay. We own gold not for the crisis of 2008, not for the potential contagion from Europe, but because there is too much debt in the world. We think inflation is likely a key component of how developed countries will try to deal with their massive debt burdens, even as cultural differences will make dynamics play out rather differently in different countries. Please see merkinvestments.com/gold for more in-depth discussion on our outlook on gold.

And what about the U.S. dollar? While much of the discussion above is relative to the U.S dollar, the greenback itself warrants its own analysis:

  • Investors in the U.S. should fear growth. The spring of 2012 saw the bond market sell off rather sharply as a couple of economic indicators in a row came out positively. Bernanke wants to keep the cost of borrowing low, but can only control the yield curve so much. That’s why, in our assessment, he is emphasizing employment rather than inflation, in an effort to prevent a major sell-off in the bond market before the recovery is firmly established. Growth is dollar negative because the bond market would turn into a bear market: foreigners’ love for U.S. Treasuries might wane, just as it historically often does during early and mid-phases of an economic upturn as the bond market is in a bear market.
  • Good luck to Bernanke to raising rates in 15 minutes, as he promised he could do in a 60 Minutes interview. Sure he can, but because there’s so much leverage in the economy, any tightening would have an amplified effect. At best, we might get a rather volatile monetary policy. But we are promised by the Fed that this is not a concern for 2013.
  • Both of these, however, suggest volatility will rise in the bond market. Remember what got the housing bubble to burst? An uptick in volatility. That’s because leveraged players, momentum players run for the hills when volatility picks up. And a lot of money has chased Treasuries, praised as the best investment for over two decades. We don’t need foreigners to sell their U.S. bonds for there to be a rude awakening in the bond market; we merely need a return to historic levels of volatility. Why is this relevant to a dollar discussion? Because a bond market selloff makes it more expensive for the U.S. to finance its deficits. Please see our recent analysis of the risks posed to the dollar by a bond market selloff for a more in-depth discussion on this topic.

Axel Merk is President and Chief Investment Officer, Merk Investments. Merk Investments, Manager of the Merk Funds.

THE ONGOING COLLAPSE IN THE PURCHASING POWER OF THE DOLLAR IS IRREVERSIBLE – TEN STEPS TO PROTECT YOURSELF

By GE Christenson

  • Our financial system, as it currently operates, is unsustainable. Unproductive debt cannot exponentially increase forever. I assume this is obvious to almost everyone. Jim Sinclair says, “The financial system is simply FUBAR. It is that simple. The reason to own all things gold is that simple.” FUBAR has several meanings, but my interpretation of FUBAR is: “Fiscally Unbalanced Beyond Any Reconciliation.”
  • The U.S. government deficits are, on average, larger every year. This means that the total (official) national debt is not only increasing each year but also that the rate of increase is accelerating. Since 10/1/2000 the national debt has increased about 9.1% per year, but since 10/1/2007 it has increased 12.2% per year. Worse, this is only the official debt and does not even consider the net present value of unfunded Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and government employee pensions and liabilities. Depending on who is calculating the liabilities, the total unfunded liability is approximately $100 Trillion to $230 Trillion and the annual increase is perhaps $7 – $11 Trillion. (The entire U.S. GDP is about $15 Trillion per year – for comparison.) This will not end well.
  • In essence, the above two facts are incompatible – hence an economic train wreck is in process. What could happen? Follow the logic here.
  • When there is too much of something, it loses value. If we have too many eggs, the price drops. If too many autos are for sale, there will be lower prices for autos. Central banks around the world are currently producing amazing quantities of dollars, euros, yen, and most other unbacked paper currencies. Hence, their value will decrease against the commodities we need for survival – food, energy, and so forth.
  • There is too much debt in our financial system, whether measured in nominal value or as a percentage of GDP. Hence the value of that debt will decline. Some debts will default, bonds will decline in value as interest rates inevitably rise, and other debt will drop in value and purchasing power.
  • Politicians have made excessive guarantees for future benefits to Social Security recipients, Medicare recipients, government pensions, and others. Those guarantees cannot all be delivered as promised, hence they will decline in value and purchasing power, or the promises will not be fulfilled.

Why are the following ten steps necessary?

  1. The best time to start preparing was about a decade ago. The second best time is today. Make a plan and act. Start by reducing living expenses and eliminating credit card debt.
  2. Expect sweeping changes! I hope the inevitable currency collapse is slow and gentle, not rapid and destructive, but history suggests rapid and painful are more likely.
  3. Phase out of paper assets and into something real. Gold, silver, diamonds, farm land, rental property, and buildings come to mind.
  4. Perspective – Perspective – Perspective! It is better to be early than late. It is better to trust yourself than to depend upon a government agency for your food and shelter. To whatever extent you can, take charge of your own financial affairs, savings, and retirement.
  5. Plan on huge inflation in consumer prices for food, energy, transportation, medical costs, and more.
  6. The middle class will be hurt the most. Those who plan and prepare will, as always, survive and prosper. Make a plan!
  7. Government control over the economy will increase. Surveillance on individuals will increase; there will be much less personal and financial privacy. Act accordingly!
  8. Social change will follow a currency collapse. It might be violent. The government is preparing in many ways for social violence. Are you?
  9. Currency induced cost-push inflation appears inevitable. When? As a guess, well before 2016. Gasoline costing $8.99 or more per gallon is a distinct possibility. Don’t discount this just because it sounds extreme. It might be a low estimate.
  10. Economic manipulations, mal-investments, and unsustainable policies will self-correct. Plan on corrections and adjustments that will bring painful consequences. The bigger the bubble, the more catastrophic the collapse and the larger the collateral damage. The sovereign debt and paper money bubbles appear VERY large and ready to pop.

Summary

Unproductive government debt cannot increase forever, but our financial system currently depends upon ever increasing expenditures and debt. There are far too many dollars in circulation, more debt than can be repaid, and massive unfunded liabilities have been created by the promises made by politicians. The purchasing power of the dollar must decline, many debts will not be repaid, and many promises for future benefits will be reduced in value or will simply disappear. Hence, the FUTURE income stream from debt-based assets is increasingly risky. A few to consider are:

  • Social Security benefits. The government must borrow or print to pay current benefits. The value (purchasing power) of future benefits will almost certainly decline.
  • Municipal and state bonds and pension promises are increasingly risky. Will more cities and states default on their bonds? Why are their pension plans, on average, increasingly underfunded? Will your pension plan remain safe? Consider moving your IRA into physical gold and silver safely stored outside the banking system.
  • US government 30 year bonds and 10 year notes will decline in price as interest rates rise, and will also decline in purchasing power as the dollar devalues. Why would you lend money (long-term) to an insolvent government at less than 3% interest per year when that government has assured you it will debase the currency and reduce the value of the debt you bought? Is this a financial train wreck in process?
  • Mutual funds and money markets based on bonds and other debt are at risk. If the underlying debt defaults, the value of the mutual funds and money markets will decline. Counter-party risk is real.

Why is debt based future income increasingly risky? The payoff will be delayed, defaulted or executed in mini-dollars after inflation and counter-party defaults have ravaged the purchasing power of those paper debts. We have Been Warned!

Would you prefer hard assets with no counter-party risk? Reread the Ten Steps To Safety, and then take charge of your financial life to whatever extent you can.

GE Christenson
aka Deviant Investor

The Fed Is Confiscating The Wealth Of The Middle Class By Destroying The Value Of The Dollar

Americans need to take a serious look at how the purchasing power of the dollar is being destroyed.  Rampant poverty, declining real incomes and higher prices are all the guaranteed results of a Federal Reserve that remains committed to destroying the value of the dollar.   A dollar saved today that has less purchasing power a year from now equates to the “silent” destruction of the dollar, an event which has gone virtually unnoticed and unprotested by the American public.

Act #4 of the Fed’s endless money printing campaign directly monetizes over a half a trillion dollars of U.S. deficit spending annually.  In addition to financing the Federal debt with printed dollars, the Fed has also explicitly endorsed  an inflation rate of 2.5% as being “acceptable.”

Impact Of 2.5% Inflation

Even a relatively “benign” inflation rate of 2.5% rapidly erodes the purchasing power of savings. Over a short 5 years, the purchasing power of $100,000 in savings is reduced to $88,110 at an inflation rate of 2.5%.  At a 5% inflation rate, the value after 5 years is only $77,378.  We don’t even want to look at how much purchasing power would be lost over a decade.

Both consumers and especially savers need to become aware of the wealth depletion caused by purchasing power loss.  From my experience, most people find it conceptually difficult to see a real loss (in purchasing power) when there has been no change in the principal amount of savings.  As John Maynard Keynes wrote in 1920, “By a continuing process of inflation, governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens.  By this method they not only confiscate, but they confiscate arbitrarily; and while the process impoverishes many, it actually enriches some.  And not one man in a million will detect the theft.”

Incredibly, the desperate attempts of central banks to prop up the over-indebted financial system via inflation and money printing is viewed as beneficial by some misguided economists.  Japan’s decision to go all in with “unlimited quantitative easing” was applauded in a recent Slate commentary.

That’s because Shinzo Abe, the overwhelming favorite to lead the Liberal Democratic Party to victory, is running on a bold platform of unlimited quantitative easing and more inflation. If this works—and the odds are that it will—Abe will not only cure a great deal of what ails Japan, he’ll light a path forward for the rest of the developed world.

But if he (Abe) does manage to stick to his guns, the odds are good that it will work. Monetary expansion should reduce the price of the yen and goose exports. More importantly, it will push domestic real interest rates down and spur investment. Creating firm expectations that yen-denominated prices will be higher in the future than they are today should encourage firms and households alike to acquire real goods sooner rather than later. And all this ought to encourage everyone to be investing and spending more.

Bernanke said Japan’s central bankers needed Rooseveltian resolve, but the moral of the story may be that it takes a politician—a Roosevelt—to have the clout and legitimacy to make central banks act decisively when an economy gets firmly mired at the lower bound. If Abe can be that Roosevelt, he’ll not only be a hero of Japan but possibly of the whole world economy. After all, if America’s old advice to Japan turns out to work in practice as well as in theory, then maybe we’ll finally get around to taking our own advice for ourselves.

Does anyone think that Japan’s temporary benefit of a lower currency will not be met with competitive devaluations by other nations?  Exactly how will Japanese consumers be able to spend more if prices increase and wages remain stagnant due to the limiting effects of wage globalization?  The Slate author firmly espouses the lunacy of currency debasement as a wealth enabler despite the fact that no nation in history has ever printed its way to prosperity.

The fact that central banks have firmly committed themselves to money printing on an unimaginable scale is not a cause for hope but rather a clear signal of desperation.  Policy makers have run out of options and in an attempt to forestall the collapse of the financial system, have turned to the last resort option of unlimited money printing.

The Hidden Risks Of Money Printing

By Axel Merk

While Treasuries are said to have no default risk as the Federal Reserve (Fed) can always print money to pay off the debt, hidden risks might be lurking. As oxymoronic as it may sound, the biggest risk to the economy and the U.S. dollar might be, well, economic growth! Let us explain.

The U.S. government paid an average interest rate of 2.046% on the $11.0 trillion of Treasuries outstanding as of the end of November. Treasuries include Bills, Notes, Bonds and Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS). At 2.046%, the cost of carrying the Treasury portfolio currently costs the government $225 billion per annum; about 6% of the federal budget was spent on servicing the national debt. 1

While total government debt has ballooned in recent years, the interest rate paid by the government on its debt has continued on its downward trend:

We only need to go back to the average interest rate paid in 2001, 6.19%, and the annual cost of servicing Treasuries would triple, paying more than Greece as a percentage of the budget. Not only would other government programs be crowded out, the debt service payments might likely be considered unsustainable. Except for the fact that, unlike Greece, the Fed can print its own money, diluting the value of the debt. In doing so, the debt could be nominally paid, although we would expect inflation to be substantially higher in such a scenario.

These numbers are no secret. Yet, absent of a gradual, yet orderly decline of the U.S. dollar over the years – with the occasional rally to make some investors believe the long-term decline of the U.S. dollar may be over – the markets do not appear overly concerned. Reasons the market aren’t particularly concerned include:

  • The average interest rate continues to trend downward. That’s because maturing high-coupon Treasury securities are refinanced with new, lower yielding securities.
  • Treasury Secretary Geithner has diligently lengthened the average duration of U.S. debt from about 4 years when he took office to currently over 5 years.

For the U.S. government, a longer duration suggests less vulnerability to a rise in interest rates, as it will take longer for a rise in borrowing costs to filter through to the average debt outstanding. The opposite is true for investors: the longer the average duration of a bond or a bond portfolio one holds, the greater the interest risk, i.e. the risk that the bonds fall in value as interest rates rise.

Debt management by the Treasury only tells part of the story on interest risk. When the Treasury publishes “debt held by the public,” it includes Treasuries purchased in the open market by the Fed. By engaging in “Operation Twist”, the Federal Reserve stepped onto Timothy Geithner’s turf, manipulating the average duration of debt held by the private sector. Notably, the private sector holds fewer longer-dated bonds, as the Fed has gobbled many of them up.

However, investors may still be exposed to substantial interest risk in their overall fixed income holdings as, in the search of yield, many have doubled down by seeking out longer dated and riskier securities.

The Fed, many are not aware of, employs amortized cost accounting, rather than marking its holdings to market, thus hiding potential losses should interest rates go up and its portfolio of Treasuries and Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) fall in value.

Quantitative easing to increase interest risk

Whenever there’s a warning that all the money created by the Federal Reserve is akin to printing money, some dismiss these concerns as the money created out of thin air to buy securities has not caused banks to lend, but park excess reserves back at the Federal Reserve. As of December 14, 2012, $1.4 trillion in excess reserves is parked at the Fed. Substantial interest risk might be baked into reserves:

Consider that the Fed has been paying about $80 billion in profits to the Treasury in recent years. Think of it this way: the more money the Fed “prints”, the more (Treasury & MBS) securities it buys, the more interest it earns. That’s why Fed Chair Bernanke brags that his policies have not cost taxpayers a cent, even if the activities may put the purchasing power of the currency at risk. Now, Bernanke has also claimed he could raise rates in 15 minutes. In our assessment, it’s most unlikely he would do so by selling long-dated securities; instead, in an effort to keep long-term rates low, the most likely scenario is that the Fed will pay a higher interest rate on reserves. Up until the financial crisis broke out, the Federal Reserve would have intervened in the Treasury market by buying and selling securities to move short-term interest rates. In the fall of 2008, the Fed was granted the authority by Congress to pay interest on reserves.

As interest rates rise, not only will Treasury pay more for debt it issues, it may also receive less from the Fed. Interest rates would have to rise to about 6% for the entire $80 billion in “profits” to be wiped out assuming a constant $1.5 trillion in reserve balances ($1.4 trillion in excess reserves and $0.1 trillion in required reserves that also receive interest); that assumes, the Fed does not grow its balance sheet in the interim (in an effort to generate more “profits” for the Fed) and would not reduce its payouts in the interim as a precaution because bonds held on the Fed’s books may be trading in the market at substantially lower levels.

Should interest rates move up, the Treasury may no longer be able to rely on the Fed to finance the deficit (while the Fed denies the purposes of its policies is to finance the deficit, the Fed is buying a trillion dollars in debt as the government is running a trillion dollar deficit).

Biggest risk: economic growth?

In our surveys, inflation tends to be on top of investors’ minds, no matter how often government surveys show us that inflation is not the problem. Should inflation expectations continue to rise – and a reasonable person may be excused for coming to that conclusion given that the Fed appears to be increasingly focusing on employment rather than inflation – bonds might be selling off, putting upward pressure on the cost of borrowing for the government.

But if we assume inflation is indeed not an imminent concern (keep in mind that the Fed is also buying TIPS and, thus, distorting important inflation gauges in the market), we only need to look back at the spring of this year when a couple of good economic indicators got some investors to conclude that a recovery is finally under way. What happened? The bond market sold off rather sharply! A key reason why the Fed is increasingly moving towards employment targeting is to prevent a recurrence, namely a market-driven tightening, pushing up mortgage costs.

The government should be grateful that we have this “muddle-through” economy. Let some of that money that’s been printed “stick;” let the economy kick into high gear. In that scenario, the “good news” may well be reflected in a bond market that turns into a bear market.

Historically, when interest rates move higher in an economic recovery, the U.S. dollar is no beneficiary because foreigners tend to hold lots of Treasuries: should the bond market turn into a bear market, foreigners historically tend to wait for the end of the tightening cycle before recommitting to U.S. Treasuries.

The point we are making is that for bonds to sell off and the dollar to be under pressure, we don’t need inflation to show its ugly head; we don’t need China or Japan to engage in financial warfare by dumping their Treasury holdings. All we may need is economic growth! And while Timothy Geithner has studiously been trying to extend the average duration of U.S. debt, Ben Bernanke at the Fed has thrown him a curveball.

Perception is reality

One only needs to look at Spain to see that a long average duration of government debt is no guarantor against a debt crisis. Spain has an average maturity of government debt of 6 years, yet it does not take a rocket scientist to figure out that borrowing at 6% in the market is not sustainable given the total debt burden. As such, markets tend to shiver when confidence is lost, even if, technically, governments could cling on for a while when the cost of borrowing surges.

History may repeat itself

It was only 11 years ago that the US government paid and average of 6% on its debt. Sure the average cost of borrowing has been coming down. But no matter what scenarios we paint, if the average cost of borrowing can come down to almost 2% from 6%, we believe it is entirely possible to have the reverse take place over the next 11 years. Given the additional risks the Fed’s actions have introduced, the timing could well be condensed. But even if not, we believe it is irresponsible for policy makers to pretend interest rates may stay low forever (except, maybe, Tim Geithner’s steps to increase the average maturity of government debt; but as pointed out, his efforts may be overwhelmed by those of the Fed).

Fiscal Cliff

What’s so sad about the discussion about the so-called fiscal cliff is that even the initial Republican proposal results in approximately $800 billion deficits each year. Financed at an average 2%, this would add over $900 billion in interest expenses over ten years; financed at an average 4%, it would add almost $2 trillion in interest expense over ten years. Mind you, this is a politically unrealistic, conservative proposal. Democrats pretend we don’t even have a long-term sustainability problem, only that the wealthy don’t pay their fair share.

In our humble opinion, both Republicans and Democrats are distracted. In many ways, the simultaneous increase in taxes and cut in expenditures of the fiscal cliff is akin to European style austerity: if the cliff were to take place in its entirety, we would a) suffer a significant economic slow down; b) continue to run deficits exceeding 3% of GDP before factoring in any slowdown; and c) still not have fixed entitlements.

Entitlements

While our discussion focused on $11 trillion in Treasury securities, the so-called “unfunded liabilities” go much further than the $5 trillion in accounting liabilities set aside. Depending on the actuarial assumptions, unfunded liabilities may be as high as $50 trillion to $200 trillion or higher.

In our assessment, the only way to tame the explosion of government liabilities over the medium term is to tame entitlements. But it is very difficult to cut back on promises made. As Europe has shown us, the only language that policy makers understand may be that of the bond market. As such, unless and until the bond market imposes entitlement reform, we are rather pessimistic that our budget will be put on a sustainable footing. Put another way, things are not bad enough for policy makers to make the tough decisions.

Different from Europe, however, the U.S. has a current account deficit. As a result, a misbehaving bond market may have far greater negative ramifications for the dollar than the strains in the Eurozone bond markets had for the Euro. In the Eurozone, the current account is roughly in balance; while there was a flight out of weaker Eurozone countries, that flight was mostly intra-Eurozone towards Germany and Northern European countries.

So while the default risk of U.S. Treasuries may be less than that of Eurozone members, the risks to the purchasing power of the U.S. dollar might be substantially higher. On that note, while the Fed has indicated to buy another approximately $1 trillion in assets over the next year, we would not be surprised to see the balance sheet of the more demand-driven European Central Bank shrink as some banks pay back loans from the Long-Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) early.

In early January, we will be publishing our outlook for 2013; Please also sign up for our newsletter to be informed as we discuss global dynamics and their impact on gold and currencies. Additionally, please join us for our upcoming Webinar on Tuesday, January 15th, 2013.

Axel Merk

Axel Merk is President and Chief Investment Officer, Merk Investments.

Gold and Stocks Diverge As Central Banks Pledge Unlimited Money Printing

Both the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan have gone all in with their attempts to revive weak, debt burdened economies with a pledge of unlimited money printing.

Japan’s incoming Liberal Democratic Party Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who ran on a platform of unlimited quantitative easing and higher inflation, has quickly forced capitulation by the Bank of Japan to surrender its independence from political influence.

The Bank of Japan pledged Thursday to review its price stability goal, admitting that the move was partly in response to incoming Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s aggressive calls for the central bank to step up its fight against deflation.

At its two-day policy board meeting, the BOJ decided to expand the size of its asset-purchase program—the main tool of monetary easing with interest rates near zero—and promised to review next month its current inflation goal, something Mr. Abe demanded during Japan’s parliamentary campaign.

Countering speculation that the board’s decision-making process is being driven by politicians, Gov. Masaaki Shirakawa said the bank reviews its price goal every year. But he acknowledged that the policy board had taken Mr. Abe’s request into account.

The Bank of Japan’s quick surrender of monetary policy independence reflected the fact that they had little choice in the matter.  Mr. Abe had previously threatened a  “law revision to take away the BOJ’s independence if it didn’t comply with his demands.  Mr. Abe said the election shows that his views have the support of the people, and, on the night of his victory, he specifically said he expected the BOJ to do something at this week’s meeting.”

The policy of unlimited money printing by Japan came shortly after similar actions were announced by the U.S. Federal Reserve in early December.  Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, architect of the U.S. “economic recovery” announced that the Fed would purchase $45 billion of US Treasuries every month in addition to the open ended monthly purchase of $40 billion of mortgage backed securities.  The Fed’s expanded “asset purchase programs” will be monetizing over $1 trillion of assets annually, effectively funding a large portion of the U.S. government’s annual deficit with printed money.

The impact of blatantly unlimited money printing by two of the world’s largest economies surprised many gold investors as the price of stocks and gold quickly diverged, with gold selling off and stocks (especially in Japan) gaining.

Why would gold, the only currency with intrinsic value that cannot be debased by governments, sell off as governments pledged to flood the world with freshly printed paper currencies?  Here’s one insight from John Mauldin.

When you reduce the amount of leverage in the system, you’re actually reducing the total money supply. So the Fed can come in and print money, and the money supply – the total amount of credit and leverage and material that’s going through the system – really hasn’t increased.

A lot of monetary economic theories say “the money supply is directly related to inflation.”

It is, but the amount of leverage and credit in the system is also directly related to inflation. It becomes a much more complicated mix. What happens at the end of the debt supercycle, as you’re reducing that leverage, you’re actually in a deflationary world. That is the whole debate between deflation and inflation.

If you read the polls in the United States, we’re just totally dysfunctional. We want to pay less taxes and we want more health care – that doesn’t work. We are going to have to be adults and recognize that problem.

The reason is the Fed is going to do everything they can to fight deflation. The only thing they can do is to print money. They’re going to be able to print more money than any of us can possibly imagine and get away with it without having inflation.

Mr. Mauldin may have a valid point, but a more likely explanation is the suppression of gold prices by governments and central banks as voluminously documented by GATA.

“Those who follow GATA may not be surprised when the monetary metals markets don’t make sense, since they really aren’t markets at all but the targets of constant intervention by governments.”

Why Silver Will Hit $100

By GE Christenson

There are many predictions for the price of silver. Some say it will crash to nearly $20, and others proclaim $100 by the end of 2012. The problem is that some predictions are only wishful thinking, others are obvious disinformation designed to scare investors away from silver, and many are not grounded in hard data and clear analysis. Other analysis is excellent, but both the process and analysis are difficult to understand. Is there an objective and rational method to project a future silver price that will make sense to most people?

Yes, there is!

I am not predicting a future price of silver or the date that silver will trade at $100, but I am making a projection based on rational analysis that indicates a likely time period for silver to trade at $100 per ounce. Yes, $100 silver is completely plausible if you assume the following:

  • The US government will continue to spend in excess of $1 Trillion per year more than it collects in revenue, as it has done for the previous four years, and as the government budget projects for many more years.
  • Our financial world continues on its current path of deficit spending, debt monetization, Quantitative Easing (QE), weaker currencies, war and welfare, ballooning debts, and business as usual.
  • A massive and devastating financial and economic melt-down does NOT occur in the next four to six years. If such a melt-down occurs, the price of silver could skyrocket during hyperinflation or stagnate under a deflationary depression scenario.

Still with me? I think most people will accept these simple and rather obvious assumptions.

Many individuals find it difficult to believe any projections for silver, either higher or lower, because silver is hated, loved, often ignored, and seldom recognized as another currency. However, most people know that the US government national debt is huge and will grow much larger during the next decade. Examine the following graph:

Click on image to enlarge.

National debt is plotted on the left axis – yes, it was larger than $16 Trillion as of September 30, 2012. Silver is plotted on the right axis. The data covers an 11 year span from September 2001 through September 2012. This period includes the time after the stock market crash of 2000, the game-changing events of 9-11, the real estate crash, and the new bull market in commodities. Each month represents one data point. Note the similarity between the two trends. The statistical measure R-Squared for this 11 year period of monthly data is 0.838 – quite high. R-Squared increases to about 0.90 if national debt is correlated to the monthly price of silver after it has been smoothed with 9 month moving average.

This expansion in the national debt is a simple proxy for expansion of the money supply and the devaluation of the dollar. The exponential growth rate for the national debt averaged over this period is 9.7% compounded annually, while the rate averaged over the last five years is 12.3%. The exponential growth rate for silver is a bit larger – about 20% per year compounded annually. I attribute this larger rate, in excess of 12.3%, to the realization that silver is a competing currency, mining supply is growing slowly, most governments are aggressively “printing money,” industrial demand is increasing, and some investors are actively buying silver. In short, demand is increasing while the realization that silver is still an undervalued investment and cannot be “printed” at will (like dollars and euros) has reached the awareness of individual investors. I believe it is very likely that national debt and the price of silver will continue their 11 year exponential growth trend.

Since silver correlates relatively closely with national debt, we can use national debt as a clear, objective, and believable proxy to model the future price of silver. Extend national debt and silver prices forward for the next six years based on the exponential increase from the last five years, and the result is the following table. Bracket silver prices, high and low, based on past annual volatility of roughly +60% and -35%. You can see from the graph that silver prices are very erratic – silver rallies too far and too fast, and then crashes to absurdly low levels. These stunning rallies and crashes have happened for at least 35 years and probably will continue throughout this decade.

Whether or not prices and crashes are manipulated, and there seems to be credible evidence to indicate such, the “big picture” view is that silver has rallied from about $4 to nearly $50, crashed back to about $25, and is set to rally to well over $100 in the next few years. The week to week movements will become even more extreme so focus on the long-term trend to reduce anxiety and fear.

As you can see, this projection for silver prices indicates that silver could reach $100 as soon as late 2015, with a theoretical projected price of $100 about 2017. The price of silver is about $32.00 as of November 1, 2012.

The next graph shows the price of silver, on a logarithmic scale, with high and low trend lines. The horizontal line at $100 shows the earliest and latest dates at which the trend lines project silver will reach that price. Those dates are 2015 through late 2017, which are consistent with the above projection based on the tight correlation to the national debt. The important realization is that $100 silver is just a matter of time – say three to five more years – depending on the level of QE “money printing,” inflationary expectations, dollar devaluations, fiscal insanity, government deficit spending, wars, and welfare. We have been warned!

Conclusion

We may be skeptical of price projections for silver, but projections for national debt are quite believable. Since the correlation is very close, future silver prices can be projected, assuming continuing deficit spending, QE, and other macroeconomic influences. A dollar crash or an unexpected bout of congressional fiscal responsibility could accelerate or delay the date silver trades at $100, but the projection is reasonable and sensible. Silver increased from $4.01 (November 2001) to over $48 (April 2011). A silver price of $48 seemed nearly impossible in 2001, yet it happened. An increase from about $32 (October 2012) to $100 (perhaps in 2015 – 2016) seems much easier to believe, especially after Bernanke’s recent announcement of QE4-Ever. Read We Have Been Warned.

“Inflation is as violent as a mugger, as frightening as an armed robber and as deadly as a hit man.” – Ronald Reagan

GE Christenson
aka Deviant Investor

Gold Ready For Explosive Rally Based On Sentiment, Seasonal Factors and Fed Money Printing

Gold has had a volatile year.  From January’s opening price of $1,598, gold quickly moved up by $183 per ounce by the end of February.  An ensuing correction that lasted into July brought the price of gold down by $225 per ounce to $1,556 in mid July, the low of the year.  In August gold started to rally, closing yesterday at $1716.25 per ounce, up $118.25 or 7.4% on the year.

Gold now appears ready to mount an explosive rally that could easily push prices past $2,000 based on sentiment, seasonal factors and rampant money printing by the Federal Reserve.

Gold Traders Bullish

According to Bloomberg, gold traders are the “most bullish in 10 weeks…the highest level since August 24.  Gold rallied strongly from August 24th, adding $124 per ounce by October 4th.

Gold traders are the most bullish in 10 weeks and investors are hoarding a record amount of bullion as central banks pledge to do more to spur economic growth.

Eighteen of 27 analysts surveyed by Bloomberg expect prices to rise next week and five were bearish. A further four were neutral, making the proportion of bulls the highest since Aug. 24. Holdings in gold-backed exchange-traded products gained the past three months, the best run since August 2011, data compiled by Bloomberg show. They reached a record 2,588.4 metric tons yesterday, the data show.

The Bank of Japan (8301) expanded its asset-purchase program on Oct. 30 for the second time in two months, increasing it by 11 trillion yen ($137 billion). The Federal Reserve said last week it plans to continue buying bonds and central banks from Europe to China have pledged more action to boost economies. Gold rose 70 percent as the Fed bought $2.3 trillion of debt in two rounds of quantitative easing from December 2008 through June 2011.

“Central banks are all very concerned about a depression, so they’re keeping monetary policies as loose as possible,” said Mark O’Byrne, the executive director of Dublin-based GoldCore Ltd., a brokerage that sells and stores everything from quarter-ounce British Sovereigns to 400-ounce bars. “People are buying gold as a store of value to protect against currency depreciation.”

Seasonal Factors

Gold has a pronounced seasonal tendency to rally strongly in the last quarter of the year.  The chart below from GoldCore shows the seasonal strength of gold over the past 30 years.

Courtesy goldcore.com

Rampant Money Printing By The Federal Reserve

Central Banks worldwide have gone on a money printing rampage to save governments that are unable to control spending or raise sufficient tax revenues.  David Einhorn, President of Greenlight Capital, who has a brilliant investment track record, is rampantly bullish on gold and raises the question of what type of truly desperate measures central banks will take if the world economy enters another recession or suffers an exogenous shock.

“It seems as if nothing will stop the money printing, and Chairman Bernanke in fact assures us that it will continue even after the economic recovery strengthens.  Even after the economy starts to recover more quickly, even after the unemployment rate begins to move down more decisively, we’re not going to rush to begin to tighten policy.  Apparently, anything less than a $40 billion per month subscription order for MBS is now considered ‘tightening’.  He’s letting us know that what once looked like a purchasing spree of unimaginable proportions is now just the monthly budget.”

“If Chairman Bernanke is setting distant and hard-to-achieve benchmarks for when he would reverse course, it is possibly because he understands that it may never come to that.  Sooner or later, we will enter another recession.  It could come from normal cyclicality, or it could come from an exogenous shock.  Either way, when it comes,  it is very likely we will enter it prior to the Fed having ‘normalized’ monetary policy, and we’ll have a large fiscal deficit to boot.  What tools will the Fed and the Congress have at that point? If the Fed is willing to deploy this new set of desperate measures in these frustrating, but non-desperate times, what will it do then?  We don’t know, but a large allocation to gold still seems like a very good idea.”

Federal Reserve Policies Have Put The Nation On The Road To Economic Chaos

By Axel Merk

The FOMC has crossed the Rubicon: our analysis suggests that the Federal Open Market Committee is deliberately ignoring data on both growth and inflation. At best, the FOMC’s intention might have been to not rock the markets two weeks before the election. At worst, the FOMC has given up on market transparency in an effort to actively manage the yield curve (short-term to long-term interest rates):

  • On growth, economic data, including the unemployment report, have clearly come in better than expected since the most recent FOMC meeting. FOMC practice dictates that progress in economic growth is acknowledged in the statement. Instead, the assessment of the economic environment is verbatim. Had the FOMC given credit to the improved reality, the market might have priced in earlier tightening. The FOMC chose to ignore reality, possibly afraid of an unwanted reaction in the bond market.
  • On inflation, the FOMC correctly points out that inflation has recently picked up “somewhat.” However, it may be misleading to blame the increase on higher energy prices, and then claim that “longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable.” Not so, suggests an important inflation indicator monitored by the Fed and economists alike: 5-year forward, 5-year inflation expectations broke out when the Fed announced “QE3”, its third round of quantitative easing where the emphasis shifted from a focus on inflation to a focus on employment. This gauge of inflation measures the market’s expectation of annualized inflation over a five year period starting five years out, ignoring the near term as it may be influenced by short-term factors:
Inflation Expectations

The chart shows that we have broken out of a 2 standard deviation band and that the breakout occurred at the time of the QE3 announcement. In our assessment, the market disagrees with the FOMC’s assertion that longer-term inflation expectations have remained stable. At best, the FOMC ignores this development because they also look at different metrics (keep in mind that the Fed’s quantitative easing programs manipulate the very rates we are trying to gauge here) or has a different notion of what it considers longer-term stable inflation expectations. At worst, however, the FOMC is afraid of admitting to the market that QE3 is perceived as inflationary.

In our assessment, inflation expectations have clearly become elevated. Ignoring reality by ignoring growth and inflation may not be helpful to the long-term credibility of the Fed. Fed credibility is important, as monetary policy becomes much more expensive when words alone don’t move markets anymore.

Please sign up to our newsletter to be informed as we discuss global dynamics and their impact on gold and currencies.

Axel Merk

Axel Merk is President and Chief Investment Officer, Merk Investments
Merk Investments, Manager of the Merk Funds

Would A Romney Victory Cause Gold To Collapse?

By Axel Merk & Yuan Fang

Monetary Cliff?

As the presidential election is rapidly approaching, little attention seems to be getting paid to the question that may affect voters the most: what will happen to the “easy money” policy? Federal Reserve (Fed) Chairman Bernanke’s current term will expire in January 2014 and Republican candidate Mitt Romney has vowed that if elected, he would replace Bernanke. Given the tremendous amount of money the Fed has “printed” and the commitment to keep interest rates low until mid-2015, the election may impact everything from mortgage costs to the cost of financing the U.S. debt. Trillions are at stake, as well as the fate of the U.S. dollar.

Should Obama be re-elected, Bernanke might continue to serve as Fed Chairman; other likely candidates include the Fed’s Vice Chairman Janet Yellen and Obama’s former economic advisor Christina Romer. With any of them, we expect the Fed policy to be continuingly dominated by the dovish camp, and moving – with varying enthusiasm depending on the pick of Fed Chair – towards a formal employment target, further diluting any inflation target. We are not only talking about Bernanke and the other two candidates’ individual policy stances (though all three are known as monetary “doves”, i.e. generally favoring more accommodative monetary policy), but also the composition of voting members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), as we will discuss below.

If Romney were to be elected, a front-runner for the Fed Chairman post is Glenn Hubbard, Dean of Columbia Business School and a top economic adviser to Romney. Hubbard has expressed his skepticism about the mechanism that Bernanke used to boost the economy. In our analysis, an FOMC led by Hubbard (or another Romney appointee) will be leaning toward mopping up the liquidity sooner. Extending forward guidance to mid-2015 will also be under question. It will no doubt add uncertainty to monetary policy and increase market volatility.

More importantly, however, a “hawkish” Fed Chair, i.e. one that favors monetary tightening, might put to the test Bernanke’s claim that he can raise rates in “15 minutes”. Technically, of course, the Fed can raise rates by paying interest on reserves held at the Fed or sell assets acquired during various rounds of quantitative easing. The challenge, no matter who the Fed Chair is going to be, is the impact any tightening might have on the economy. Bernanke has cautioned many times that rates should not be raised before the recovery is firmly “entrenched.” What he is referring to is that market forces may still warrant further de-leveraging. If the stimulus is removed too early, so Bernanke has argued, the economy might fall back into recession. A more hawkish Fed Chair, such as a Glenn Hubbard, may accept a recession as an acceptable cost to exit monetary largesse; however, because there is so much stimulus in the economy, just a little bit of tightening may well have an amplified effect in slowing down the economy. Keep in mind that European countries are complaining when their cost of borrowing rises to 4%, calling 7% unsustainable. Given that the U.S. budget deficit is higher than that of the Eurozone as a whole, and that our fiscal outlook is rather bleak, it remains to be seen just how much tightening the economy can bear. Our forecast is that with a Republican administration, we are likely to get a rather volatile interest rate environment, as any attempt to tighten may have to be reversed rather quickly. Fasten your seatbelts, as shockwaves may be expressed in the bond market and the “tranquility” investors have fled to by chasing U.S. bonds may well come to an end. Foreigners that have historically been large buyers of U.S. bonds may well reduce their appetite to finance U.S. debt, with potentially negative implications for the U.S. dollar.

Let’s dig a little deeper and look at who actually decides on interest rates: it is the voting members of the FOMC that ultimately make the imminent monetary policy decisions, rather than the noise creating pundits and non-voting members.

Three factors will further boost the dovish camp, which already dominates the FOMC committee:

    • Two previously vacant seats on the Fed’s Board of Governors were recently filled by Jeremy Stein and Jerome Powell this May. Like other board governors, both Stein and Powell appear to be in favor of Bernanke’s dovish policy. Stein was a Harvard economics professor and used to be more ‘hawkish’ before he took office. But in his first keynote speech as a board governor on Oct. 11, Stein openly supported QE3 and called for continuing asset purchases in absence of a substantial improvement in the labor market. Jerome Powell was a lawyer and private equity investor as well as an undersecretary under George H.W. Bush. Powell has also expressed support for more easing, with inflation an afterthought. Their appointments not only fill all voting seats at the Fed for the first time since 2006, but also further increase the board’s dove-hawk ratio from 9-1 to 11-1. The influence will also carry on to the following years, as board governors hold non-rotating voting rights.
    • Additionally, four current voting members will be replaced next year, including Richmond Fed president Jeffrey Lacker, who has dissented in every FOMC meeting this year. Regional Fed Presidents, unlike Governors, vote on a rotating basis. In 2013, Kansas Fed president Esther George is likely to be the only voting member who appears to hold a hawkish stance. George has expressed her opposition to QE3 and the Fed’s balance sheet expansion, echoing her predecessor Thomas Hoenig’s hawkish tone. But given that she is not a Ph.D. economist, her passion and influence is likely to be more on regulatory than monetary issues; we doubt she will be as vocal as Hoenig or Lacker. In our assessment, the FOMC committee may be “über-dovish” in 2013.
    • Finally, Minneapolis Fed President Narayana Kocherlakota, who was known as a monetary policy hawk, has recently shifted to a more dovish stance. He surprised the market with remarks supporting the Fed’s decision to keep rates extraordinarily low until the unemployment rate has fallen below 5.5%, as long as inflation remains below 2.25%. Kocherlakota will be a voting member in 2014, but his shift of stance will weaken the hawkish voice. With fewer dissidents on the board, the Fed may continue to err firmly on the side of inflation and stick to to its mid-2015 low rate pledge.

No matter who wins the election, we will see a policy dilemma for the Fed in the coming years: On the one side, should economic data continue to surprise to the upside, it will be increasingly difficult for the Fed to carry on its dovish policies. On the other side, if the Fed were to abandon its current commitment, we foresee rising market volatility. The U.S. economy is likely to face a “monetary policy cliff” in addition to the “fiscal cliff”. With easy money, inflation risks may well continue to rise, possibly imposing higher bond yields (lower bond prices) and a weaker dollar. With tight money, the Fed may induce a bond selloff. Historically, because foreigners are active buyers of U.S. bonds, the dollar has weakened during early and mid-phases of tightening, as the bond bull market turns into a bear market. It’s only during late phases of tightening that the dollar has historically benefited as the bond market turns yet again into a bull market. We encourage investors to review their portfolios to account for the risk that bonds may be selling off, taking the U.S. dollar along with it.

Please sign up to our newsletter to be informed as we discuss global dynamics and their impact on gold and currencies. Please also register for our Webinar on Thursday, November 8th, 2012, where we will focus on implications on China and Asian currencies.

Axel Merk

Axel Merk is President and Chief Investment Officer, Merk Investments

Yuan Fang is a Financial Analyst at Merk Investments and member of the portfolio management group.

The Fed’s Outrageous Attempt To Debase The Dollar Will Send Gold Soaring

By Axel Merk

Doubling down on QE3, the Federal Reserve (Fed) Chairman Bernanke tells China and Brazil: allow your currencies to appreciate. One does not need to be a rocket scientist to conclude that Bernanke wants the U.S. dollar to fall. Is it merely a war of words, or an actual war? Who is winning the war?

The cheapest Fed policy is one where a Fed official utters a few words and the markets move. Rate cuts are more expensive; even more so are emergency rate cuts and the printing of billions, then trillions of dollars. As such, the Fed’s communication strategy may be considered part of a war of words. Indeed, the commitment to keep interest rates low through mid 2015 may be part of that category. But quantitative easing goes beyond words: QE3, as it was announced last month, is the Fed’s third round of quantitative easing, a program in which the Fed is engaging in an open-ended program to purchase Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS). To pay for such purchases, money is created through the strokes of a keyboard: the Fed credits banks with “cash” in payment for MBS, replacing MBS on bank balance sheets with Fed checking accounts. Through the rules of fractional reserve banking, this cash can be multiplied on to create new loans and expand the broader money supply. The money used for the QE purchases is created out of thin air, not literally printed, although even Bernanke has referred to this process as printing money to illustrate the mechanics.

Why call it a war? It was Brazil’s finance minister Guido Mantega that first coined the term, accusing Bernanke of starting a currency war. Here’s the issue: like any other asset, currencies are valued based on supply and demand. When money is printed, all else equal, supply increases, causing a currency to decline in value. In real life, the only constant is change, allowing policy makers to come up with complex explanations as to why printing money does not equate to debasing a currency. But even if intentions may have a different primary focus, our assessment is that a central bank that engages in quantitative easing wants to weaken its currency. It becomes a war because someone’s weak currency is someone else’s strong currency, with the “winner” being the country with the weaker currency. The logic being a weaker currency promotes net exports and GDP growth. If the dollar is debased through expansionary monetary policy, there is upward pressure on other currencies. Those other countries like to export to the U.S. and feel squeezed by U.S. monetary policy. Given that politicians the world over never like to blame themselves for any shortcomings, the focus of international policy makers quickly becomes the Fed’s monetary largesse.

Bernanke speaking at an IMF sponsored seminar in Tokyo pointed to the other side of the coin: if China, Brazil and others don’t like his policies because they create inflation back home, they should allow their currencies to appreciate. But these countries are reluctant as stronger currencies lead to a tougher export environment.

Now keep in mind that it is always easier to debase a currency than to strengthen it. Switzerland, the previously perceived safe haven by many investors, has taken the lead. Using a central bank’s balance sheet as a proxy for the amount of money that has been printed, the Swiss National Bank’s printing press has surpassed that of the Federal Reserve considering relative growth since August 2008. Again note that no real money has been directly printed in these programs; also note that some activities, such as the sterilization of bond purchases by the European Central Bank, cause a central bank balance sheet to grow, even if sterilization reflects a “mopping up” of liquidity:

Japan has warned about intervening in the markets on multiple occasions, but the size of the Japanese economy as well as the lack of political will make an intentional debasement more difficult. Indeed, the Japanese did their money printing in the 1990s, but forgot we had a financial crisis in recent years.

Bernanke does acknowledge the concerns of emerging markets, but argues they are blown out of proportion. He elaborates that undervaluation and unwanted capital inflows are linked: allow your currencies to appreciate (versus the dollar) and you won’t have to be afraid of excessive capital inflows, inflation and asset bubbles. Ultimately, and importantly, Bernanke says the Fed will continue its course, suggesting that it will strengthen the U.S. economic recovery; and by extension, strengthen the global economy.

Let’s look at the issue from the viewpoint of emerging markets: policy makers like to promote economic growth, among other methods, through a cheap exchange rate, up to a certain point. They don’t want too much inflation or too many side effects. Historically, they manage these side effects with administrative tools. However, taking China as an example, taming price pressure through, say, price controls, has not been very effective. We believe that’s a good thing, as China would otherwise experience product shortages akin to what the Soviet Union experienced. Conversely, however, China must employ a broader policy brush to contain inflationary pressures. We believe – and Bernanke appears to agree – currency appreciation is one of the more effective tools.

So how will this currency war unfold? The ultimate winner may well be gold. But as the chart above shows, it’s not simply a race to the bottom. If one considers what type of economy can stomach a stronger currency, our analysis shows an economy competing on value rather than price has more pricing power and therefore the greater ability to handle it. Vietnam mostly competes on price; as such, the country has, more than once, engaged in competitive devaluation. At the other end of the spectrum in emerging markets may be China: having allowed its low-end industries to move to lower cost countries, China increasingly competes on value. Within Asia, we believe the more advanced economies have the best potential to allow their currencies to appreciate. It’s not surprising to us that China’s Renminbi just recently reached a 19-year high versus the dollar.

What we have little sympathy for is an advanced economy, e.g. the U.S., competing on price. We very much doubt the day will come when we export sneakers to Vietnam. As such, a weak dollar only provides the illusion of strength with exports temporarily boosted. Yet the potential side effects, from inflation to the sale of assets to foreign investors with strong currencies, may not be worth the risk.

Please register to join us as we discuss winners and losers of the unfolding currency wars in our Webinar this Thursday, October 18, 2012.

Axel Merk is President and Chief Investment Officer, Merk Investments
Merk Investments, Manager of the Merk Funds.